

**AMENDMENTS TO THE DRAWINGS:**

The attached sheets of drawings include changes to Figs. 1-2 and Figs. 3a-3f. These sheets, which include Figs. 1-2 and Figs. 3a-3f, replace the original sheets including Figs. 1-2 and Figs. 3a-3f. In Figs. 1-2, descriptive labels for boxes have been added. In Figs. 3b-3d, the label "Prior Art" has been added.

Attachments: 3 Replacement Sheets

## REMARKS

This Preliminary Amendment cancels without prejudice claims 1 to 11 in the underlying PCT Application No. PCT/DE03/02310, and adds without prejudice new claims 12 to 26. The new claims, *inter alia*, conform the claims to United States Patent and Trademark Office rules and do not add new matter to the application.

In accordance with 37 C.F.R. § 1.125(b), the Substitute Specification (including the Abstract) contains no new matter. The amendments reflected in the Substitute Specification (including Abstract) are to conform the Specification and Abstract to United States Patent and Trademark Office rules or to correct informalities. As required by 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.121(b)(3)(ii) and 1.125(c), a Marked-Up Version of the Substitute Specification comparing the Specification of record and the Substitute Specification also accompanies this Preliminary Amendment. Approval and entry of the Substitute Specification (including Abstract) are respectfully requested.

The underlying PCT Application No. PCT/DE03/02310 includes an International Search Report, dated November 3, 2003. The Search Report includes a list of documents that were uncovered in the underlying PCT Application. A copy of the Search Report accompanies this Preliminary Amendment.

It is asserted that the subject matter of the present application is new, non-obvious, and useful. Prompt consideration and allowance of the application are respectfully requested.

Respectfully Submitted,

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METHOD AND DEVICE FOR CONTROLLING OPERATIONAL SEQUENCES,  
PARTICULARLY IN A VEHICLE

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Field of the Invention

The present invention relates to a device and a method for  
controlling and/or regulating operational sequences,  
10 particularly in a motor vehicle. In this context, in which a  
functional unit for forwarding and receiving data via at least  
one connecting unit is in contact with at least one bus  
system. ~~The functional unit is monitored by a monitoring unit,~~  
~~the sensing of data by the functional unit via the at least~~  
15 ~~one bus system is prevented by the monitoring unit in case an~~  
~~error of the functional unit is detected.~~

~~The present invention also relates to a device for controlling~~  
~~and/or regulating operational sequences, particularly in a~~  
~~motor vehicle. The device includes at least one functional~~  
20 ~~unit which, for forwarding and receiving data via at least one~~  
~~connecting unit, is in contact with at least one bus system.~~  
~~Besides that, the device includes at least one monitoring unit~~  
~~which monitors the functional unit. The monitoring unit~~  
~~prevents the forwarding of data by the functional unit via the~~  
25 ~~at least one bus system in case it detects an error of the~~  
~~functional unit.~~

~~Finally, the present invention also relates to a control unit~~  
~~for controlling and/or regulating operational sequences,~~  
~~particularly in a motor vehicle. The control unit includes a~~  
30 ~~functional unit which, for forwarding and receiving data via~~  
~~at least one connecting unit, is in contact with at least one~~  
~~bus system, and a monitoring unit which monitors the~~  
~~functional unit. The monitoring unit prevents the forwarding~~  
~~of data by the functional unit via the at least one bus system~~  
35 ~~in case it detects an error of the functional unit.~~

## Background Information

A circuit configuration for decoupling an electronic device from a data line in a motor vehicle is ~~known from~~ described, e.g., in published German patent document DE 198 33 462-A1.

5 The electronic device and at least one additional electrical system exchange data via the data line, during the operation of the electronic device. In the case of the circuit configuration where vehicle operation can be maintained despite a malfunction of an electronic device connected to the  
10 data line, the electronic device is connected to a fault detection device. In response to the fault detection device ascertaining a fault of the electronic device, the electronic device is decoupled from the data line by the circuit configuration, the serviceability of the electronic system  
15 being maintained.

In published German patent document DE 198 33 462 A1 ~~the important thing~~ aspect ~~is particularly~~ the monitoring of the data line and the detection of errors in the data line, which could impair the operability of the electronic device that is  
20 connected to the data line. The error detection device is switched into the data line for decoupling the electronic device from the data line in the error case, and it includes electrical switching elements so as to be able to cut off the data line in case of error. That assumes, however, that in  
25 each data line to which the electronic device is connected and which is supposed to be cut off in the error case, switching elements have to be situated.

~~A method and a device of the type mentioned at the outset are known from~~ Published German patent document DE 100 30 996 A1.  
30 ~~There it is proposed that~~ describes an arrangement in which the functional monitoring of the functional unit by the monitoring unit is able to be activated or deactivated by the functional unit, using a switching element. The switching element is able to be implemented by the setting or deleting of a bit.  
35 During an activated monitoring function, the functional unit is disconnected from the bus system by an access. For this,

the monitoring unit activates an additional switching element, by which the connection of the functional unit to the bus system is interrupted. Here too, it has proven problematical that likewise separate switching elements have to be provided in the connection between the functional unit and the bus system, so that the functional unit is able to be decoupled from the bus system in the error case.

In addition, from the ~~related~~prior art, monitoring concepts for functional units are known, ~~especiall~~e.g., for motor vehicle control units, in which the monitoring unit triggers a reset in the error case. As a result of the reset, the functional unit runs up and thereafter attains its operational state. If the error of the functional unit continues to exist, the monitoring unit detects the error only in the newly operational state, and only then does it trigger again a reset of the functional unit. The forwarding of data by the functional unit via the bus system is only prevented for a short period of time during the reset state, since only in this state are the input/output connection positions (so-called ports) of the functional unit inactive. Thus, in the known method, a faulty functional unit may possibly forward faulty data via the bus system, even though the monitoring unit has detected an error of the functional unit. This may lead to safety-relevant situations in the control of the operational sequences.

~~The~~An object of the present invention is based on the object of to provide preventing of the forwarding of data by the functional unit via the bus system safely, reliably and in a simple manner.

### Summary

~~For the attainment of this object, the~~The present invention ~~proposes, starting from the method of the type mentioned at the outset,~~provides that an error signal is emitted by the monitoring unit that assumes different values as a function of whether an error of the functional unit has been detected or not, and that the error signal is applied at the at least one

connecting unit, and the at least one connecting unit is deactivated by the applied error signal if an error of the functional unit has been detected.

#### ~~Summary of the Invention~~

5 In the method according to the present invention, no reset is triggered by the monitoring unit in response to a detected error, but rather a connecting unit that is situated between the functional unit and the bus system is simply switched off. The connecting unit is developed, for example, as a signal  
10 amplification device, ~~especially~~e.g., as a bus driver circuit of the bus system (so-called bus driver). The bus driver is ~~used particularly, e.g.~~ for amplifying a bus signal generated by bus control (so-called bus controller), before it is transmitted via the bus system, as well as for signal  
15 conditioning that is free of retrospective effect. Thus, according to the present invention, the functional unit per se remains in an operable state and is still able to generate data. However, these data are no longer able to be transmitted via the bus system, since the connecting unit  
20 required for the forwarding of data has been deactivated.

By the use of the method according to the present invention, the impairment of other functional units, which are in contact via the bus system with the faulty functional unit, is prevented in a simple manner. Consequently, in the error  
25 case, an erroneous functional unit is not able to forward any potentially faulty or undesired data via the bus system. This results in intrinsically safe individual systems in an integrated network.

It is ~~especially~~ advantageous that the forwarding of data by the functional unit may be prevented safely and reliably, without the use of additional switching elements between the functional unit and the bus system or in the bus system itself. In addition, using the present invention, the forwarding of data by the functional unit ~~is permanently~~may be  
30 prevented indefinitely, which has the advantage compared to the reset of the functional unit that the faulty functional  
35

unit is ~~at no time~~not able ~~any more~~ to forward data via the bus system. To the extent that the errors of the functional unit permit it, the latter still works quite normally, i.e., it still generates data for controlling and/or regulating the operational sequences, these data, however, possibly being erroneous. However, these data are not able to be transmitted via the bus system. By permitting further operation of the functional unit, it is possible to continue to monitor the functional unit, even in the error case, and ~~directly to~~once again permit ~~again~~ the forwarding of data by the functional unit as soon as the error of the functional unit no longer occurs.

The reason for the ~~necessary prevention of~~need to prevent the forwarding of data by the functional unit in the error case is that an erroneous functional unit ~~possibly~~may no longer ~~have~~ control over itself and over the correct generation of data to be sent, and because of its own error it is also not able to switch itself off reliably and safely. Because of a defective functional unit in an integrated network, in which several functional units are in contact with one another via a bus system, there is a danger that the remaining receiving functional units on the bus system may receive erroneous data from the erroneously forwarding functional unit, and thus prompted, carry out unwanted actions. These actions triggered by erroneous data may also have a safety-relevant effect on the operational sequences that are to be controlled. Taking the example of motor vehicle control units, a control unit for the internal combustion engine could, in the error case, for example, cause a transmission control unit to shift down into lower gears, whereby the vehicle could arrive at an unstable travel state.

According to one ~~advantageous refinement~~example embodiment of the present invention, it is ~~proposed~~provided that the error signal is applied to a reset input of the at least one connecting unit. ~~The reset input is also designated as reset input.~~ In case of an error, the connecting unit is able to be deactivated by the error signal present at the reset input.

According to one ~~preferred~~example embodiment of the present invention, it is ~~proposed~~provided that the functional unit is in contact with several bus systems and that the error signal is applied to connecting units of several of the bus systems.

5 The advantage of the present invention, that the forwarding of data by an erroneous functional unit is able to be prevented safely and reliably without the use of additional hardware, such as, for instance, additional switching elements for interrupting the connection between erroneous functional unit  
10 and bus system, is especially useful when the erroneous functional unit is in contact not only with one but with several bus systems, via which data are able to be sent to other functional units. In all bus systems that are connected to the erroneous functional unit and which are to be  
15 deactivated in case of an error, the error signal of the monitoring unit is conducted to the connecting units. Bus systems which are only used for transmitting data of non-safety-relevant operational sequences (e.g., of comfort functions), do not necessarily have to be switched off in case  
20 of an error of the functional unit.

Furthermore, according to an example embodiment of the present invention, it is ~~proposed~~provided that the error signal be applied at the outputs of components whose operational sequences are controlled or regulated by the erroneous  
25 functional unit. These components are, for example, outputs of the ignition, the fuel injection and/or the throttle valve of an internal combustion engine. The aim of this measure is to bring the internal combustion engine safely to a stop, in case of an error in the controlling or regulating functional unit.

30 It is ~~proposed as particularly~~may be advantageous that, after the detection of an error of the functional unit, the functional unit continues to be monitored by the monitoring unit, and the at least one connecting unit is activated again in case a proper function of the functional unit is detected.  
35 This renewed activation of the connecting units is possible at any time in the present invention. In contrast, in the ~~related prior~~ art, in which, in case of an error, a reset of



the erroneous functional unit is executed, a proper functioning of the functional unit could only be detected ~~subsequently~~subsequent to the reset and the running up of the functional unit. Consequently, using the present invention, one may improve not only the safety of an integrated network which includes several functional units that are in contact with one another via a bus system, but also the availability of the integrated network, since the proper functioning of a functional unit may be detected particularly rapidly.

~~As an additional attainment of the object of the present invention it is proposed, starting from the device of the type named at the outset, that the~~The monitoring unit ~~should~~has means for forming and emitting an error signal which, assumes different values as a function of whether or not the monitoring unit has detected an error of the functional unit, and that the error signal ~~should be~~is conducted to the at least one connecting unit and that the at least one connecting unit should be able to be deactivated by the error signal that is present, if the error of the functional unit was detected. The device corresponds, for example, to an integrated network that includes several functional units which are in contact with one another via a bus system.

According to one ~~advantageous refinement~~embodiment of the present invention, it is ~~proposed~~provided that the error signal is applied to an enable/disable input of the at least one connecting unit. Alternatively, it is ~~proposed~~provided that the error signal be conducted to a reset input of the at least one connecting unit.

The device advantageously includes several functional units which are connected to one another via a bus system, and at least one monitoring unit, the monitoring unit preventing the forwarding of data by a functional unit via the at least one bus system, in case the monitoring unit has detected an error of this functional unit. Such a device corresponds to the so-called multi-control unit concept that has increasingly been used in motor vehicles recently, in which several control

units are put in in parallel to one another to increase computational performance, the individual control units each controlling a certain part of the operational sequences. Thus, for example, in a two-control unit concept for  
5 controlling an 8-cylinder internal combustion engine, a first control unit is put in for controlling four of the cylinders and a second control unit for controlling the remaining four cylinders. The two control units are in contact with each other via a bus system. Data concerning the operational state  
10 of the internal combustion engine or of the motor vehicle are only supplied to the first control unit, which then passes the data on to the second control unit via the bus system. If the monitoring unit of the first control unit detects an error of the control unit, it deactivates the connecting unit of the  
15 bus system to the second control unit, so as to prevent the first control unit from forwarding erroneous data to the second control unit and having the second control unit controlling the remaining four cylinders of the internal combustion engine in a faulty manner and even possibly having  
20 a safety-relevant situation coming about.

Finally, as still another ~~attainment of the object~~example embodiment of the present invention, it is ~~proposed, starting from the control unit of the type named at the outset,~~  
provided that the monitoring unit ~~should have~~ has means for  
25 forming and emitting an error signal which assumes different values as a function of whether or not the monitoring unit has detected an error of the functional unit, and that the error signal ~~should be~~is conducted to the at least one connecting unit and that the at least one connecting unit ~~should be~~is  
30 able to be deactivated by the error signal that is present, if the error of the functional unit was detected.

#### ~~Brief Description of the Drawings~~

~~Further features, uses and advantages of the present invention come to light from the following description of exemplary~~  
35 ~~embodiments of the present invention which are shown in the drawings. In this context, all of the described or~~

~~represented features, alone or in any combination, form the subject matter of the present invention, regardless of their combination in the patent claims or their antecedents, as well as regardless of their formulation and representation in the specification and drawings. The figures show:~~ Brief Description of the Drawings

Figure 1 shows an example embodiment of a control unit of the present invention according to one preferred specific embodiment,

Figure 2 shows an example embodiment of a device according to the present invention, including two control units according to the present invention, which are in contact with one another via a bus system, and

Figure 3a shows a time curve of the state of an error counter of monitoring module.

~~Figure 3~~ Figures 3b-3d show the curves of various states and signals of a conventional control unit known from the related art (Figures 3b to 3d) compared to the control unit according to the present invention (Figures 3e and 3f).

Figures 3e-3f show the curves of various states and signals of the control unit according to the present invention.

~~Description of the Exemplary Embodiments~~ Detailed Description

In Figure 1, a control unit SG according to the present invention is designated in its entirety by reference numeral 1. Control unit 1 is used, for example, for controlling and/or regulating operational sequences in a motor vehicle. Subsequently, we will go into more detail, for example, on a control unit 1 for controlling of operational sequences in an internal combustion engine of a motor vehicle. However, the present invention is generally applicable to all types of control units SG, such as for transmission control, vehicle dynamics control, drive slip control (ASR), an automatic distance control (EDC; electronic distance control), adaptive cruise control (ACC), etc, which control units are in contact

with one another via a bus system 2 to an integrated control unit system, and which exchange data among one another via bus system 2. Bus system 2 is, for instance, developed as a CAN (controller area network).

5 Control unit 1 includes a functional calculator FR 3 which is designed, for instance, as a microprocessor or as a microcontroller. A computer program is able to be run on functional calculator 3 which is used to carry out the control and/or regulating function of control unit 1. Functional  
10 calculator 3 is in contact with bus system 2 via connecting unit 4, for forwarding and receiving data. Connecting unit 4 is designed as a hardware interface between a controller and an external control unit monitoring bus having a signal amplification device, especially as a bus driver circuit, e.g.  
15 as a CAN driver for a CAN bus system. ~~CAN driver~~, i.e., connecting unit 4 is also designated as CAN driver.

The data generated in functional calculator 3 within the scope of executing the computer program to fulfill the control and/or regulating function of control unit 1 are first  
20 transmitted to a CAN control 6 via a data bus 5, which is also designated as CAN controller. In CAN control 6, the data generated by functional calculator 3 are put into a format corresponding to the CAN protocol, and are prepared for transmission via CAN bus system 2. Before transmission of the  
25 processed data, the signals have to be adapted to the electrical properties on the CAN bus. For this purpose, the processed data are transmitted via a two-wire data line 7 from CAN control 6 to CAN driver 4, which puts the signals on CAN bus system 2.

30 Independent hardware for functional monitoring functional calculator 3 is assigned to functional calculator 3. The independent hardware is designated as monitoring module UM 8. Monitoring module 8 cyclically poses various questions to functional calculator 3, which run through voluminous control  
35 mechanisms, such as program sequence controls or command tests in functional calculator 3, and form a result. The result is

transmitted back to monitoring module 8 as a response to the question. A functional calculator working error-free supplies back the correct response within a predefined time window. Monitoring module 8 determines by evaluating the response whether an error of functional calculator 3 has occurred or not. The monitoring-~~concept-described~~ of functional calculator 3 by monitoring module 8 is also designated as inquiry-response communication. The communication between monitoring module 8 and functional calculator 2 takes place via an SPI (serial parallel interface) interface 9.

By evaluating the response of functional calculator 3, an error signal WDA is generated in monitoring module 8, which assumes different values as a function of whether an error of functional calculator 3 was detected or not. Preferably, an error counter is incremented if an error of functional calculator 3 is detected.

Error signal WDA is emitted only when the error counter has exceeded a threshold value. Error signal WDA is applied, via a signal line 10, to outputs E1 to EN of motor vehicle components K1 to Kn, which are activated by control unit 1 for controlling and/or regulating the operating sequences. In a motor vehicle control unit 1 for controlling and/or regulating an internal combustion engine, these are, for example, the outputs for ignition, fuel injection and/or throttle valve. The activation of outputs E1 to En using error signal WDA is for the purpose, in case of error, to bring the internal combustion engine safely to a standstill and to avoid safety-relevant situations.

According to the present invention, error signal WDA is also applied to a reset input RST of CAN driver 4. CAN driver 4 is deactivated by the error signal that is present in case an error of functional calculator 3 was detected. Thereby the forwarding of data by a defective functional calculator 3 via CAN bus system 2 is prevented reliably, effectively and, above all, durably for the entire duration of the error of the functional calculator. Thereby, also, the forwarding of

possibly erroneous information by erroneous functional calculator 3 via CAN bus system 2 to other functional calculators is prevented in a simple manner. Consequently, control unit 1 according to the present invention represents an intrinsically safe individual system in a composite control unit system. It satisfies the rules for control units in a composite control unit system, namely that each control unit 1 itself bears the responsibility for the data forwarded by it.

An additional advantage of the present invention is that an erroneous functional calculator 3 continues to operate normally and continues to ascertain data, albeit some possibly erroneous, for controlling the operating sequences.

Monitoring module 8 is thus able to continue to monitor the operability of functional calculator 3 even after detecting an error of functional calculator 3. As long as monitoring module 8 detects an error of functional calculator 3, CAN driver 4 remains deactivated so that the erroneous data ascertained by erroneous functional calculator 3 do not get onto CAN bus system 2 and are able to impair other functional calculators of the composite control unit system. However, as soon as monitoring module 8 detects a proper functioning of functional calculator 2, CAN driver 4 may be activated again, so that control unit 1 is able to operate quite normally again. In the present invention, it is advantageous that a proper functioning of functional calculator 3 is able to be detected without a long time delay.

Another advantage of the present invention may be seen in that the forwarding of data by an erroneous functional calculator 3 may be prevented in a simple manner and without additional hardware, for example, without additional circuit elements that are put into the CAN bus system and are opened in the error case in order to separate functional calculator 3 from CAN bus system 2.

In Figure 2 a multi-control unit concept, ~~to say it more~~ accurately, a two-control unit concept, is shown in which two control units SG1 and SG2 for controlling certain operating

sequences are used. In the exemplary embodiment shown, the two control units SG1, SG2 for controlling the operating sequences in a 12-cylinder internal combustion engine BM 11 are used. In this context, first control unit SG1 controls the first six cylinders ZYL 12 and the second control unit SG2 controls the remaining six cylinders ZYL 13. First control unit SG1 receives data S via driver command (setting of the gas pedal) and/or via the operating state of internal combustion engine 11 and of the motor vehicle from corresponding sensors. Control units SG1 and SG2 are connected to each other via a CAN bus system 2. Second control unit SG2 receives setpoint inputs (e.g. the driver's command) from first control unit SG1, via CAN bus system 2. ~~In order to avoid that, in case of an error of functional~~ calculator FR1 of first control unit SG1, in order to avoid erroneous setpoint inputs ~~are being~~ transmitted to second control unit SG2, according to the present invention, the forwarding of data by functional calculator FR1 via CAN bus system 2 is prevented by monitoring ~~unit~~ module ÜM1. To do this, error signal WDA of monitoring module ÜM1 is applied to a reset input RST of CAN driver 4.

With the aid of the data transmission that fails to materialize (message interruption, or rather ~~missing~~ no updating), control unit SG2 is able to detect a defect in SG1, and to activate corresponding substitute measures or error reactions in SG2.

Figures 3a to 3f show curves of various control unit states and control unit variables plotted against time t. In particular, Figure 3a shows the state of an error counter of monitoring module 8. At the beginning, this rises from zero to above a threshold value SW. As soon as the error counter exceeds threshold value SW, an error reaction is triggered at time  $t_1$ . That means that error signal WDA assumes a corresponding value. As values of error signal WDA, HIGH and LOW are especially applicable.

The curves shown in Figures 3b, 3c and 3d correspond to the ~~relatedprior~~ art. Figure 3b shows the curve of a reset signal which, according to the ~~relatedprior~~ art, is applied by monitoring module ÜM 8 to a reset input of functional calculator FR 3. At time  $t_1$  the error reaction is triggered which, according to the ~~relatedprior~~ art, consists in triggering a reset of functional calculator FR 3. Figure 3c shows the curve of a quantity "CAN signal released". The signal has the values "free" or "blocked". From Figure 3c one may see that the CAN signal is only blocked during the reset ( $RST = 1$  in Figure 3b) and is otherwise free. As long as CAN signal is released, even an erroneous functional calculator FR 3 may possibly transmit erroneous data via CAN bus system 2. Under certain circumstances, this may trigger erroneous reactions in other functional calculators FR of the composite control unit system.

Figure 3d shows various states of control unit SG that is known from the ~~relatedprior~~ art. Before triggering the error reaction at time  $t_1$ , control unit SG runs through a quite normal travel program A. Thereafter, a reset state B follows after time  $t_1$ . Subsequently, control unit SG runs an initializing phase C, and then in turn changes into normal travel program A. During travel program A, monitoring module ÜM carries out an inquiry-response communication with functional calculator FR that is to be monitored, and detects at time  $t_2$  that the error of functional calculator FR is still there. Thereafter, the system runs afresh through the above-described states reset B, initializing C and travel program A with inquiry-response communication D.

Figures 3e and 3f show the signal curves and state curves of control unit 1 according to the present invention. In Figure 3e one may clearly recognize that the CAN signal is blocked for the duration of the error directly after the error reaction at time  $t_1$ . After the error reaction, functional calculator 3 is in a quite normal travel program A, during



which an inquiry-response communication D is cyclically executed, and the outputs via the WDA signal are in a deactivated state (E). However, the data ascertained by functional calculator 3 are not transmitted via CAN bus system 2, since CAN driver 4 has been deactivated and consequently the CAN signal is blocked. In the present invention, in the error case, functional calculator 3 is never in a situation in which the operability of functional calculator 3 could not be checked by an inquiry-response communication. By contrast, in the ~~related~~prior art, in the error case, checking the operability of functional calculator 3 could not take place during the states reset B and initializing C. It is for this reason that the proper functioning of functional calculator 3 is detected earlier in the case of the present invention than with the related art.

~~Abstract~~

ABSTRACT

The present invention ~~relates to~~provides a method and a device for controlling operational sequences, in particular in a vehicle. In this context, a functional unit (3) ~~for forwarding and receiving data via at least one connecting unit (4)~~ is in contact with at least one bus system (2). Functional unit (3) is monitored by a monitoring unit (8). The monitoring unit (8) prevents the forwarding of data by the functional unit (3) via the at least one bus system (2) ~~if it~~the monitoring unit detects an error of the functional unit (3). In an error case, in order to prevent the forwarding of data by functional unit (8) ~~in a manner~~ as simple as possible ~~a manner~~, yet one that is safe and reliable, ~~it is proposed that~~ an error signal (WDA) ~~be~~is emitted by the monitoring unit (8), which error signal assumes different values as a function of whether an error of the functional unit (3) has been recognized or not, and the error signal (WDA) ~~be~~is applied to the at least one connecting unit (4) ~~and such that~~ the at least one connecting unit (4) ~~be~~is deactivated by the error signal (WDA) ~~that is present~~, if an error of the functional unit (3) has been detected.

~~(Figure 1)~~